chainoftrust.dev · install-time trust reportsINTAKE · FORM 1
Never executedstructural, not policy
Should I let my agent install this?
Paste a repository URL. You get a report on what installing it would actually do: what the install path executes, whether published checksums are ever verified, and what gets written into your agent's configuration.
Accepts a GitHub URL, owner/repo, a commit or branch URL, npm:name or pypi:name. Verdicts are public.
Plan of inquiry: six views
VIEW A-1
Install path
Does an installer exist, does the release publish checksums or signatures, and can the verification code actually run?
VIEW A-2
Agent config
Hooks, skills, MCP registrations or plugin manifests that reach an agent's harness before any install step.
VIEW A-3
Registry provenance
Does the registry entry bind the published files to the build that produced them?
VIEW B-1
Blast radius
Which environment variables and hosts the install path touches, and are any credential-shaped?
VIEW B-2
Trust root
How concentrated are publishing rights, and what is the real lineage?
VIEW B-3
Unauditable surface
How much of what you would receive cannot be reviewed by reading it?
Method of survey
no clone: files read one at a time over HTTPSno shell, no filesystem, no process spawningrepository prose: nonce-fenced, treated as datafetch budget + per-file byte cap
What this is not
Not a vulnerability scanner. Where an existing tool is authoritative it is cited, not duplicated: OpenSSF Scorecard for maintenance hygiene, Socket for registry alerts. The question here is what a piece of software asks permission to do when you install it. Two of these views have no equivalent in either tool: install path reachability (does the verification code actually run) and agent config auto-discovery (what reaches an agent's harness before any install step).
Example reports, not an index
A handful of reports we picked to show the shape of one: what the annotations look like, what the chain of trust draws, what the install-path schematic looks like when there is an installer to draw. Not everything analysed and not an activity feed, just examples.
EXAMPLE
ollama/ollama
Installer runs with elevated privileges and never checks the checksums its own release publishes.